I. INTRODUCTION
Nihil sub sole novum. 1 Early in the fall semester of 1929, Columbia Law Professor Karl Llewellyn delivered a series of lectures "to introduce the students of Columbia Law School to the study of law," including the "case method."
2 Adopting a lively, spirited tone, Llewellyn likened the case method to the fabled bramble bush, a barbed plant into which "a man … wondrous and wise," jumped only to scratch out his eyes and, after some amount of suffering, return to scratch "them in again." 3 Rigorous but rewarding, legal education was well worth it. "[A]s the tonic iodine burns in the wounds and beneath the skin," rhapsodized LLewellyn, "the [student's] whole body tingles with that curious bubbling sense of muscle pleasure," a sense that "for too much law, more law will be the cure." 4 Five years later, in the winter of 1935, the 43 year old law professor strummed a darker chord. American law schools were a "sham" declared Llewellyn to an audience at Harvard in the midst of the nation's worst economic crisis in history. 5 Rather than train students for the job market, law schools took their students' "coin" and, in return, offered little more than a "pretense of training for the law." 6 While legal education had invigorated him only five years before, now it sickened him; law schools were mere "conveyor belts," industrial facilities aimed at "massproduction." Then -suddenly -happy days returned. By 1956, midst an economic boom that lasted over a decade, Llewellyn cast himself joyously back into the bramble bush, extolling legal education and legal scholarship. "Look about you," implored Llewellyn of a group of law professors at a conference in Michigan, " [o] ne out of three, before this academic year is out, will not only be doing legal research -every man of law has been doing that all his life -one of you three will be doing or contributing to a bit of significant legal research." 8 This, argued Llewellyn, was "something new in this America," particularly since he could "remember when legal research other than into doctrine -except perhaps in the fields of history, crime and divorce -seemed, if not disreputable, at best queer." 9 Now, argued Llewellyn, the field was ripe for inter-disciplinary work, conducted by the "double or treble discipline law teacher," capable of "cut[ing] moats across the path of the social scientist who seeks to work in that disregarded, even almost disreputable discipline, the law." 10 Law's long struggle to gain academic respectability remains one of the most over-looked aspects of the history of legal education, even though it helps explain the prominence of theoretical research in law schools today.
11 During the 1920s, for example, law professors at elite schools promoted theoretical scholarship in a deliberate bid to improve the intellectual integrity of legal education generally. This continued during the Great Depression, even as many blamed law schools for poorly preparing students, a move that -like today -yielded calls for reform. 12 However, proposals for reform in the 1930s differed from current suggestions in that they argued not simply for more apprenticeship-style programs -a popular current corrective -but also for more interdisciplinary offerings, an "integration of the human and the artistic with the legal." 13 While most critics today argue that law schools spend too much time on such pursuits, even outspoken critics of legal education in the 1930s did not.
14 Law teachers in the 1930s remembered all too well the battles that law schools fought to earn academic parity with other university departments during the early Progressive era, an ordeal that lasted from the 1890s through the 1920s. 15 Christopher Columbus Langdell pioneered this project, in part by hiring non-practitioner teachers, declaring law a science, and promoting the case method. 16 continued it, arguing that "the background of social and economic fact and policy" should be integrated with case materials lest law professors "fail of our job." 17 Meanwhile, law schools worked steadfastly to acquire the same degree-granting privileges that other university divisions enjoyed, a battle that became particularly intense over the question of the doctorate in law, or JD. 18 As law schools lobbied to grant doctorates, they found it necessary to overcome their trade school reputation by deliberately making their programs more research oriented. 19 This struggle coincided closely with a lengthening of the law school curriculum from two to three and, in some cases, even four and five years. 20 Taking Karl Llewellyn's meditations on legal education as a lens, this Article posits that the Depression-era law school crisis informs current debates about the direction of legal education, in particular calls that law schools should discourage theoretical scholarship in order to dedicate more time to practical skills. While moving legal education in a more practical direction may have its advantages, stripping the J.D. of its academic garb may not. Already, the Juris Doctor demands a lighter research requirement than the PhD; de-robing it further may only rekindle old critiques that law schools lack academic rigor and, ultimately, legitimacy. Instead, reformers may be better off considering the benefits of conferring plural law degrees -much as schools did in the pastconferring Master's degrees for less than three years of study, J.D.'s for three, and S.J.D.'s, or research doctorates, for more.
To elaborate, this Article proceeds in four parts. Part II recovers the political history behind Langdell's initial decision to elevate law teaching beyond the trade school model, tying it first to the rise of the Bachelor's and then the Master's degrees in law. Part III demonstrates how the Bachelor's of law degree grew from a two to a mandatory three year program as law schools struggled to improve their academic profiles within larger university systems. Part IV shows how the Great Depression complicated this effort, pushing many to question the length and value of legal education as law firm hiring declined. Finally, Part V illustrates how reforms wrought during the Depression introduced more theoretical work into the first three years, reduced interest in optional graduate work, and While the history of legal education is nothing new, relatively little attention has been paid to the precise manner in which curricular reform intersected with the conferral of law school degrees. 22 Yet, the move to a single degree did much to eliminate variation among schools, pushing all schools toward a three year template that stressed an "academic" approach. 23 For schools that either possessed or aspired to build a research reputation, this may have been a good thing, even if it undermined support for advanced independent research. However, for schools that did not aspire to be part of a larger research university, the push for a Juris Doctor may have been a mistake. 24 
II. THE CASE METHOD AS PRACTICAL SKILLS
Prior to the Civil War, legal education in America focused on the law office. 25 Aspiring attorneys worked as apprentices to experienced practitioners, free from classroom instruction or formal academic supervision.
26 Though a few isolated law schools existed, universities generally struggled to mount viable law programs. 27 Princeton, George Washington, New York University and Alabama all founded law schools during the antebellum period only to promptly see them close for lack of enrollment.
28 21 See infra Part V. 22 While historians show that "prominent legal educators" lobbied for a two year curriculum in the 1970s, few note the tension between this move and the even larger "J.D. movement" sponsored by lower ranked schools hungry for heightened prestige. Following the Civil War, claims that apprenticeships lacked rigor began to coalesce, particularly as the economy industrialized and legal markets grew.
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Top lawyers formed bar organizations, sponsored "systematic bar examinations," and called for "more rigorous training" of new attorneys. 30 Some complained that law office apprenticeships proved erratic, leading to the vetting of lawyers who had little general knowledge but were trained simply to perform rote tasks. 31 Others complained that the law office model lent itself to political corruption, placing political acuity above legal acumen.
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One such critic was Christopher Columbus Langdell, a practicing attorney in New York who had worked his way through Harvard Law School as a librarian; taking three years rather than the customary one and a half. 33 his time in the library, they argued, Langdell manufactured the idea that law was a "science" consisting of "certain principles or doctrines," each of which have evolved, over time, in "slow degrees," and " [t] his growth was to be traced in the main through a series of cases." 39 Practitioners, even scholars, came to view this method as the product of a lawyer "unready for the courtroom," a "sensitive spectacled student" someone who remained "unduly trusting in knowledge from books," precisely because he could not hold his own against seasoned New York City attorneys. 40 Yet, historian Bruce Kimball argues convincingly that even as Langdell mined the library, so too did he became deeply involved in practice, serving as lead or co-counsel in at least fifteen "prominent" cases between 1855 and 1870, meanwhile joining "the vanguard of those pioneering a new role in litigation" by focusing more heavily on "extensive" brief writing than "oral argument." 41 Thanks to his success, Langdell gained clients like the Erie Railroad, became known for possessing "the highest legal ability," and argued cases with "increasing frequency" during his time in New York. 42 In fact, Langdell's success as a practicing attorney -not his naiveté -led him to become estranged from the practicing bar precisely because he approached legal work in a formal, assiduous manner; a tack that most office-trained attorneys in New York found alien. 43 The more Langdell succeeded as a practitioner, the more he became convinced that law-office apprenticeships fell short, leading to widespread "ignorance" and "incompetence" within the bar. 44 In New York, such incompetence enjoyed the aid of an 1846 law making all state judges elected, placing much of the city's judiciary directly under the control of Tammany Hall's William "Boss" Tweed, who handed out judgeships as a form of political patronage, often to supporters who had little if any legal training. 45 Meanwhile, New York abolished "demanding examinations" for aspiring attorneys that same year; lowering the "standards of expertise" required to begin practice. provided students with a general overview of the law, sparing them the trouble of actually reading judicial opinions. 56 Bold in its departure from tradition; Langdell's pedagogical "innovation" sparked initial "hostility." 57 According to Langdell's protégé James Barr Ames, "[h]ardly one" of the lawyers in Boston at the time "had any faith in it," nor did most students seem to like it. 58 After his first lecture based on the case method, Langdell's class enrollment "dwindled to a handful of students." 59 Many walked out of the room. 60 Others chose not to enroll, leading to a precipitous drop in Harvard's class size. 61 Langdell persisted. To bolster his new method, he encouraged the hiring of law professors who had little, if any, legal experience. "What qualifies a person … to teach law," argued Langdell, "is not experience in the work of a lawyer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in learning law." 62 Langdell's casebook explained why. He assigned his students one hundred twenty six cases on the substantive topic of consideration at a time when most attorneys focused less on substantive topics than procedure, particularly forms of pleading. 63 As historian William LaPiana notes, leading lawyers "lauded the 'science' of pleading," more than they did a command of substantive topics since forms of pleading tended to determine case outcomes. 64 Law teachers followed, publishing treatises on pleading that became more popular than treatises on doctrinal subjects. 65 According to law professor James Gould, pleading comprised "the most important single title in the law" in part because all questions of common law depended on whether they were accurately pled.
Yet, pleading changed dramatically in 1848, when the state of New York adopted a new Code of Procedure named after David Dudley Field. 67 Enacted as part of a larger effort to simplify the state's judicial system, the Field Code did away with separate courts of law and equity, establishing a unified "court of appeals." 68 Field had long argued for such a court, claiming that complex disputes should be brought in one forum and "settled in one action," with pleadings that "told as simply as possible what happened," not pleadings that adhered to complex, predetermined forms. 69 For the practicing lawyer, this meant that attorneys did not simply need to know "the rules of pleading," but also "the legal principles" underlying their claims. 70 This, in turn, encouraged a renewed attention to cases. "Under the [Field] Code," argues LaPiana, "the careful lawyer had to concentrate on a close reading of earlier cases to find a narrower sort of precedent -one in which the facts resembled the case at hand." 71 For Langdell, the Field Code coincided nicely with his new approach to legal education, one focused less on pleadings and more on cases. The more students engaged in "the careful searching of past cases for particular circumstances," he believed, the better they would be at providing "analogies" for use in Field Code pleadings. 72 Langdell's own career demonstrated the logic of such an approach. While other lawyers exploited political connections and mastered procedural forms, Langdell built his reputation on reading cases, eventually developing an encyclopedic knowledge of New York law that garnered him a regional reputation.
Precisely because private study bolstered his career, Langdell came to believe that those best equipped to instruct students were those who excelled at case work in school, not necessarily those who succeeded in practice. This may have stemmed from his own experience. Long before Langdell entered the practicing bar, he worked as a research assistant to Harvard Law professor Theophilus Parsons who pushed him and his fellow assistants to digest over six thousand cases for his treatise on contracts. 73 This point warrants some comment. Prior to Langdell, law students could be successful without learning much about cases, absorbing most of their information through general lecture. 74 At Columbia University, for example, law professor James Kent noted that the school dedicated a mere four lectures to the entire subject of Contracts in its first year curriculum, leaving students with little sense of where the principles of contract derived, or how they applied in specific circumstances. 75 Lawyers trained in law offices arguably knew even less. Even those who augmented their practical training with independent study; like Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, ended up knowing next to nothing about judicial opinions; how they were crafted, what legal principles they held, or how they might be synthesized. 76 For example, Blackstone dedicated one chapter in his four volume treatise to the subject of Contracts, presenting little more than a general overview of contract doctrine. 77 To make matters worse, no headnote system existed, most cases were not reported, and judges in cities like New York tended to rule based on their professional connections and political leanings. 78 For this very reason, Langdell actually became convinced that practitioners threatened to inculcate the wrong values in students, instilling "the arts of chicane and self-promotion," not doctrinal expertise or logical consistency.
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Suspicious of the notion that practice made for sound pedagogy, Langdell revolutionized law school teaching, a point historians have long recognized. Yet, as the next section shall demonstrate, Langdell's reforms intersected in subtle ways with a larger law school interest in being considered equal, academic partners in university systems. Critical to this move was an effort to boost admissions criteria, curricular content, and law school length.
III. A SECOND BACHELOR'S IN 3 YEARS
As Langdell reformed legal pedagogy, law schools worked diligently to make entrance into their programs more competitive. In 1876, Columbia became the first law school to require an entrance exam, though it only applied to applicants who had not graduated from a "literary 74 college."
80 College graduates were "admitted without examination" under the theory that they had already proven their academic merit. 81 Nongraduates, on the other hand, had to pass an entrance exam on "Greek and Roman History," the "History of England and of the United States (of North America), English Grammar, Rhetoric," and finally "the principles of composition" as used "in Caesar's Gallic War (entire), six books of Virgil's Aeneid," and "six orations of Cicero."
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At the time, Columbia required only two years of study, a span that Professor John W. Burgess attacked as insufficient in 1881. 83 Burgess proposed a three year program before students could qualify for a "Bachelor of Laws" degree. 84 A majority of the faculty disagreed, arguing that students should gain a Bachelor after two years, with the option of continuing on for a third year to earn a "Master of Laws" degree. 85 Columbia University President Frederick Barnard balked at such a move, declaring the mere notion that a student who had not attended college might gain entrance to Columbia Law School and receive a master's degree within three years to be a "farce."
86 Instead, Barnard proposed that only students who boasted both a Bachelor of Laws and a Bachelor of Arts degree should be admitted into the optional, third year Master's program. 87 One advantage of such a program, argued Barnard, was that it "would bring in additional revenue without incurring additional expenses." 88 Another advantage was that it would better position Columbia vis a vis Harvard and Yale, both of whom adopted an optional third year for those interested in a Master's degree in the 1880s. 89 Despite initial reluctance, the Board of Trustees finally approved a mandatory third year for all students interested in pursuing a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1888, making Columbia the first law school not only to implement an admissions exam but also to require a mandatory, three year course of study.
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This warrants some comment. Rather than respond to a clear and compelling need, say a demand for a year of supervised clinical work akin to medical school residencies, the mandatory third year at Columbia focused more specifically on deepening students' understanding of doctrinal subjects. As Professor Dwight put it in 1890, "[t]he theory" behind the third year was the assumption that a student in going through the two years course has obtained a good general outline of the law, and is now prepared to take up special subjects in detail." 91 Such subjects, continued Dwight, included topics of "intrinsic importance," matters frequently used "in the affairs of life," and areas of unusual difficulty; including corporations, Federal Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Law. 92 Not all agreed with the merits of such an approach. Some argued that charging one more year's tuition discriminated against less affluent students, reserving law school to the sons of wealthy families."
93 Others complained that the move to three years aimed to shift the emphasis of the school away from practical training and towards more theoretical concerns. 94 As one student put it, the third year amounted to little more than "padding out the course with 'political science,'" an oblique reference to an effort by University President Seth Low to integrate programming and build bridges between departments, all part of raising Columbia College to the status of a university.
95 Among Low's directives was a requirement that all applicants to law school first complete "three years of college," and that the second year of law school be dedicated to more explicitly academic concerns, including forty lectures in political science.
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That the law school suffered pressure from the university to focus on theoretical, inter-disciplinary courses is worth noting. Though training attorneys remained a core aspect of the school's mission, so too did the institution aspire to remain a respected division of the larger university; a place supportive of research and theoretical work. For example, law professor John Burgess delivered lectures on decidedly non-skills based courses like comparative law, constitutional history, diplomatic history, and international law as early as the 1870s. 97 At the time, Burgess hoped to "neutralize the intense professionalism of the Law School" by lecturing on public law subjects, in essence providing a counterpoint to the school's exclusive focus on training attorneys. 98 As Burgess put it, he hoped to elevate the academic reputation of the school "by supplementing the studies in Private Law," contracts, corporations, wills, and so on, with "studies in Ethics, History, and Public Law," all of which he grouped together as integral parts of "the science of Jurisprudence." 99 He also hoped to train students for positions in government, a dream that his successors would take up during the Great Depression. 100 Not simply an academic, Burgess hoped that training in political science might also prepare students for careers in civil service. GOEBEL, HISTORY, 87 (1955) . A similar debate emerged at Columbia in the 1850s, when Francis Lieber pushed to include courses While the private law faculty tolerated Burgess, some viewed his theoretical courses to be better suited for advanced candidates with academic aspirations. Such was the view of Professor Theodore Dwight, who argued that courses in public law should be reserved for an optional, post-graduate year of study. 101 Specifically, Dwight argued for an elective third year devoted to theoretical and/or public law topics, resulting in a Master of Laws degree. 102 Of course, this was before the law school moved to a mandatory third year. Had the law school moved to such a year in 1878 rather than 1888, Burgess might have succeeded in molding the third year curriculum. As it was, however, he met significant resistance to merging theoretical work with private law courses in the limited two year program that still existed in the 1870s. 103 Frustrated, Burgess requested and received permission to found a separate School of Political Science, the university's first "nonprofessional graduate school" in 1880. 104 As political science broke from law, it left the private law faculty, and the case method, ascendant. 105 Few personified this transition better than William Albert Keener, a Harvard hire who rejected the lecture approach of men like Burgess and worked diligently to nudge his colleagues in the direction of the case method, arguing that it offered a more rigorous training than lectures and recitations. Like Langdell, Keener believed that after studying a series of cases, students left class better trained, more conversant on the particulars of legal doctrine, and better able to extract general rules from a set of specific circumstances. Others articulated this view as well. For example, Eugene Wambaugh noted in his 1894 treatise The Study of Cases, that "having collected several cases bearing more or less directly upon the point," students subsequently "attempt[] by combination and comparison to ascertain what doctrine is to be deduced from the cases taken together." 106 This process of "combining and comparing cases" assumed a quasi-scientific aspect, involving the same "methods of induction" used by scientists to analyze experiments, though the experiments were replaced by "many thousands" of cases. 107 Precisely for this reason, law teachers who had not practiced stood an equal if not better chance of successfully guiding students through the study of cases, a form of pedagogy that had little to do with real world experience.
Yet, students were not unanimously pleased. While some appreciated the victory of the case method over "attorneyism," others lamented the new teaching style, as Harvard students had over two decades before. They also protested the extra third year.
109 A significant number of students in the Class of 1892 refused to stay for the extra year, opting to simply take the Bar exam without graduating. 110 A similarly minded cadre of faculty members defected from Columbia and formed a rival school, the New York Law School, dedicated to opposing the case method and maintaining a two year program.
111 By 1904, New York Law School had become the biggest law school in the United States, even as Columbia saw its enrollment drop precipitously. 112 Yet, Columbia persisted, led in large part by Keener's growing conviction that the study of cases imparted the most practical skill of all, namely the ability to engage in "legal thinking and legal reasoning."
So dominant became Keener's emphasis on reasoning that the more academically minded faculty conceded his method to the first three years, arguing that students interested in theoretical work should be allowed to remain on for a fourth, optional year, resulting in a Master of Laws degree. 114 Granted in conjunction with the Faculty of Political Science, the Master of Laws required that students take additional courses either in the law school or the School of Political Science, including courses on economics, history, and public law. 115 At the end of their year, applicants sat for examinations in "Comparative Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Roman Law, International Law, History, Economics, and "Social Ethics."
116 However, no express research requirement was imposed.
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Columbia's decision to award a Master's degree after four years was noteworthy; evidence that the school was resolving the tension between practical skills and research by relegating practical skills to the Bachelor of Laws, meanwhile elevating research to the Master's level. This satisfied the predominantly private, practitioner oriented faculty by not watering down their curriculum, even as it maintained the law school's academic profile by reserving theoretical work for advanced study. Finally, reserving the Master's for those who took interdisciplinary courses in Political Science went far towards preserving a meaningful distinction between the degrees.
Yet, some wanted the school to go even farther. As early as 1908, University President Nicholas Butler proposed a doctorate in law, or "Doctor Juris," to the Trustees. 118 However, faculty in Political Science and Philosophy balked at such a move, afraid that it would cheapen the university's Doctor of Philosophy, or PhD.
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To accommodate such concerns, the law school agreed to a "compromise scheme" by which "the doctorate in law" would "be administered by a joint committee of the Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure Science, and Law, so as to maintain common standards for the two degrees."
120
The Trustees approved a "Doctor Juris" in 1923.
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The Juris Doctor dramatically increased inter-disciplinary offerings at Columbia, as "the Faculties of Political Science, Business, and Philosophy," all offered "seminars and problem courses" to doctoral candidates in the law school. 122 The doctorate also increased the emphasis on research at the school, offering students the opportunity to complete a substantive research project, or dissertation. 123 Students who undertook to write a dissertation received a Master of Laws after one year of coursework and were then allowed to complete their dissertation in absentia.
124 Thus, the law school assumed a degree structure not unlike the rest of the university, with a Bachelor's for preliminary work and a Master's and Doctorate for advanced, theoretical study.
Yet, not all members of the faculty were satisfied; some arguing that the law school should jettison its emphasis on training practitioners completely and focus instead on pure research. 125 One such professor, Herman Oliphant, wrote to Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler in 1923 asking him to approve "more concentrated research on the interrelation of law to the other social sciences -research so concentrated that it ought to be the sole concern of the School, to the exclusion of everything else."
126 Butler denied the request, but the issue reemerged in a self-study completed in 1928 that divided the faculty.
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According to Oliphant and others, the school should "abandon its traditional purpose of preparing students for practice" and focus instead on devoting itself "to critical, constructive, creative, research." 128 A contingent of professors lobbied for Oliphant to become dean, a move that met resistance from the rest of the faculty, including the university President. "the study of law in terms of underlying political, economic, and social factors."
131 This included retaining standard courses like Civil Procedure, Corporations, and Partnerships; meanwhile adding non-doctrinal courses on "public law, legal history, and jurisprudence." 132 The latter aimed at "reevaluat[ing] legal institutions in terms of their effects, in order that the law might be more usefully employed, and to revise their curricula and methods of teaching so as to accustom lawyers to the use of knowledge derived from other fields of knowledge."
134 During those talks, Llewellyn stressed the value of the training that the students were about to receive. "We have discovered," he began, "that students who come eager to learn the rules, and who do learn them, and who learn nothing more, will take away the shell and not the substance" of legal education. 135 That substance, he continued, came in part from the study of cases, precisely because they demonstrated how "general proposition[s]" were best illustrated by focusing on "concrete instances," of how general principles applied to specific circumstances.
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Simply imparting general principles, argued Llewellyn, "hinder[ed]" rather than "help[ed]" instruction because the practice of law focused less on imparting rules than resolving "disputes." 137 Such disputes were relevant to attorneys precisely because their "oldest job" was to serve as "advocate[s,] for clients, both by counseling them and lobbying on their behalf in court.
138 "Lawyers are lawyers because they alone among men devote themselves with some constancy to studying out what courts are going to do," he argued.
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What courts did played directly into the identification and comprehension of legal rules. Once students had deciphered the language of each case, maintained Llewellyn, then they were to identify the dispute in question, remembering that courts only decide a "particular dispute" "according to a general rule." 140 At the "kernel" of each opinion, he continued lay the "rule of the case." 141 Hence, by reading through a series of cases students not only came to learn the general rule, but how that rule applied in different contexts. Further, students learned to decipher which facts were relevant and which were irrelevant to comprehending rules, a process arrived at through a series of questions.
142 Once students identified the relevant facts, they then moved to the rule of the case, and were subsequently pushed to compare that case to others. To Llewellyn, the comparing of more than one case "brings us at last," he noted, "to the case system." 143 Simply reading one case on a legal topic, he argued, was futile, for "no case can have a meaning by itself."
144 "Standing alone," he maintained, cases provided "no guidance" into legal rules; what gave students "sureness" was relating "the background" of different cases, forming the "foundation of the case system." 145 To Llewellyn, the case system was itself a type of game, a "game of matching cases," that "proceed[ed]" by "a rough application of the logical method of comparison and difference." 146 Llewellyn's lectures revealed that the case method had done more than simply prepare students for practice under the Field Code; it demonstrated Keener's objective of imparting a particular way of thinking. 147 "From this angle, moreover," he wrote, "you will observe another value in the study of the cases. 148 Each opinion is an example of legal reasoning -with and from prior cases." 149 He warned against students going "too early to the writers" of treatises, noting that "[t]o do so is to come under strong temptation to skip through the process of case matching." 150 By matching cases, students honed their analytical skills, developing a more rigorous habit of reasoning than if they had simply read treatises outlining the general principles of law. 151 Llewellyn's exuberance over the case method underscores the extent to which the approach had come to dominate legal education by the close of the 1920s, even after scholars like Oliphant argued for a more contextual course of study. As we have seen, the method's initial adoption bore a distinctly practice-oriented objective, one that coincided with Langdell's own practice experience and with changes in pleading wrought by New York's Field Code.
152 By 1929, however, the popularity of the method far exceeded its relevance simply to procedural rules in New York. As Columbia Law School Professor William Keener put it, the method developed "reasoning powers," in part by inculcating "legal analysis and synthesis."
153 Future Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone reiterated this point, noting that the case method ultimately helped elevate law schools to their "proper relation" with the American university, in part by instilling "a more profound knowledge of legal principles" that transcended technical training. 154 According to historian Julius Goebel, "the widespread adoption of the case method" in American law schools led legal education to become "highly standardized" by 1920, based heavily on an "accepted pattern of [case] study." 155 Yet, the case method's ascension would face a unique challenge during the Great Depression, as the next section will show. Law teachers at Columbia, in particular, moved to broaden legal education not simply by adding public law courses to the traditional curriculum, but transforming that curriculum itself, de-emphasizing the case method and including interdisciplinary components within traditional courses as early as the first and second year. This move invariably exploded the tiered approach to legal education established by Columbia in the 1920's, a fracturing brought on by slowdowns in hiring due to the Great Depression. As the nation sank into a decade of decline, some even blamed the case method for contributing to the crisis. As we shall see, critics agreed that the preparation of practice-ready attorneys remained paramount, even as it required a more expansive, interdisciplinary curriculum.
II. LLEWELLYN & THE DEPRESSION
When Karl Llewellyn delivered his first Bramble Bush address to law students in the fall of 1929, few anticipated the economic crisis about to hit the nation. 156 Even the "avalanche of liquidation" that rocked the stock market on Tuesday October 23 rd did not strike observers as the beginning of a decade-long crisis, some foolishly heralding the crash as a "long-predicted" market "correction" likely to "purge the economic system of unhealthy toxins." the nation was simply "caught up in yet another of the routine businesscycle downswings" that "periodically" affected America's "boom-andbust economy."
158 Perhaps for these reasons, Karl Lewellyn expressed little consternation in his Bramble Bush lectures that legal education was either in crisis or in need of change.
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By 1935, however, things had worsened. Few could deny that the country was in the midst of "a colossal financial meltdown" impacting "not only the notoriously idle rich" but "struggling neighborhood banks, hard-earned retirement nest eggs, and college and university endowments." 160 America's gross domestic product fell by half its 1929 level, "millions" lost their homes, and "25 percent of the work force" found itself jobless. 161 According to Columbia Law Professor Herbert Wechsler, the Depression "had a damned demoralizing effect" on recent law graduates, not least because "jobs were scarce," but also because "salaries were low." 162 Even "large and well-established" firms like Sullivan & Cromwell, Davis Polk, and Cravath, De Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood posted only "rare vacancies," pushing many to find work at "much smaller outfits" for "very little return." 163 As the magnitude of the crisis became apparent, Karl Lewellyn revised his opinions on legal education. In a lecture delivered at Harvard on January 22, 1935, he announced that legal education had become "blind," "inept," "factory-ridden," "wasteful," "defective," and "empty." 164 Part of law school's problem, began Llewellyn, was that it had lost touch with the kinds of jobs that law graduates actually acquired, focusing too heavily on corporate "legal factory-hand" work and not enough on students who went into small firms, politics, and "government 158 167 To Llewellyn's mind, European schools provided an alternate model of legal education, aspects of which were worth replicating in the United States. In Germany, for example, students completed three years of course work only to then begin "a further three years of directed, rounded, apprenticeship," funded in part by the government, which provided students with a "modest stipend." 168 "What have we done," asked Llewellyn, along similar lines? The answer was nothing.
American schools "face[d] the absence of any apprenticeship at all," he noted, implying that some form of law office training needed to be returned to the law school curriculum. 169 Yet, even as Llewellyn endorsed a return to practice, he by no means abandoned the case for academics. In fact, he lobbied for something arguably new in legal education, a merger of case study with contextual material. " [W] e either integrate the background of social and economic fact and policy," into law school courses, argued Llewellyn, "or fail of our job." 170 This was new, particularly in the context of private law courses. Yet, Llewellyn believed strongly that such courses warranted revision, and that a purely academic faculty possessed the best qualifications for doing so. To his mind, academic, full time faculty remained the most able to provide "perspective" on the case method, including "social and economic fact and policy." 171 The reason for this, he posited, was because "legal rules" by themselves meant "next to nothing," and that students needed to understand the context of such rules in order to effectively counsel clients.
172 Such contingencies included an inquiry into sociology and political science, something that lawyers were poorly equipped to provide.
173 " [W] hen it comes to broadly social facts, in their social bearings, lawyers are helpless," argued Llewellyn, "[t]hey fall for the tripe that journalists talk" a colorful way of saying that lawyers lacked critical perspective, preferring instead to "manhandle statistics" for tactical reasons.
174
Convinced of the importance of an inter-disciplinary approach, Llewellyn called for reform; modifying his longstanding endorsement of the case method with calls for new approaches to legal pedagogy; including an emphasis on non-traditional, inter-disciplinary material.
175
"The need is," he exclaimed; "for an integration of the human and the artistic with the legal," ultimately with an eye to broadening the career opportunities of law school graduates who may not receive jobs as "legal factory-hand[s]" in large corporate firms, what Llewellyn termed the "upper reaches of the corporation-factory." 176 The economic strain of the Great Depression loomed large in Llewellyn's arguments, pushing him to acknowledge the need for new approaches given new market conditions, particularly the decline of big firm hiring and the "recent trend" of jobs in "government administration," particularly Roosevelt's New Deal. 177 However, Llewellyn revealed some concern about mounting interdisciplinary, non-doctrinal courses like "Legal History, Legal Philosophy, and Jurisprudence."
178 Noting that earlier reformers had rushed to "pile on" such courses in a "fourth year" of law school, Llewellyn countered that three years was ample time to gain a satisfactory legal education, provided that professors recognized the importance "of integrating background -social or philosophical -into every course."
179 "[C]ritique is of the essence," he maintained, "not only of understanding and reform, but of practice," therefore law professors should strive to provide "background" material "as an inevitable part of the rule-material studied." 180 "The professor's job," concluded Llewellyn, "involves incorporating the "fact-background necessary to give to a policy, inquiry interest; to a rule, meaningfulness; to a counseling-question, body; [and] to a critical evaluation, hands and feet." 181 Llewellyn's interest in augmenting the case method with external materials is worth noting. Columbia had long mounted non-doctrinal courses, as we have seen. However, such courses tended to accumulate at the Master's and Doctorate level, not during the first three years. Now, Llewellyn proposed that the entire curriculum assume an interdisciplinary, policy-centric cast; including even private law courses traditionally taught via the case method.
However, in a manner that is worth noting today, Llewellyn did not view a more inter-disciplinary focus to be less practical.
182 "I think the most lamentable thing about American legal education," he declared during a talk at Duke Law School in 1936, "is it has taken into account neither the society in which the job must be performed nor what we are educating for." 183 Foremost in Llewellyn's mind was the cost of legal education and the need to represent the poor, both complicated by calls for "standards" from practitioners and Bar Associations. 184 "Who," asked Llewellyn, is going to spend four years in college and three years in law school and five years building up a practice to go down and work for $5.00 or $10.00 on a case[?]" 185 Legal clinics, he argued, were simply not well-staffed enough to address the need for "poor man's law work," particularly at a moment when over half the population found itself mired in poverty. 186 Next, Llewellyn blasted legal education for failing "to equip" students "for the practice of law." 187 "How is it possible," he argued, "for three years' law school and one bar examination to equip a man for the practice of law?" 188 Not a concern during his Bramble Bush talks, Llewellyn suddenly seemed extremely interested in the incorporation of apprenticeships into the law school curriculum, perhaps because law firms had stopped hiring students with little or no practice experience. 189 "Where is the apprenticeship here?" he wondered, rejecting Langdell's view that law teaching should be separate from practice. 190 "[E]very lawyer," he observed, "hires a kid at a loss for the first six months at least," something fewer firms proved willing to do under Depression-era constraints. 191 "We need an apprenticeship again," announced Llewellyn, alluding to the pre-Langdellian days of law office learning. 192 Even as he called for a return to antebellum apprenticeships, however, Llewellyn did not reject the case method. Provided that cases were not over-edited, they too served a practical purpose; they were "concrete."
193 "Every case in an office is new," he declared, and "[y]ou can help get ready for that, with your casebook." 194 However, over-edited casebooks were dangerous. "Many casebooks," posited Llewellyn, "edit their facts right out of the picture," reducing their utility to "a bunch of judicial essays, each about nothing concrete and rather badly put together." 195 The end result of this trend, he announced, was that students did not "begin to learn law" until they were "out of law school" and, when they did, it was "in spite of" their teachers. 196 Midst his drubbing of legal pedagogy, Llewellyn made an odd claim. "I think that one of the things that goes to make lawyers is to make the law a cultural study." 197 He noted that calls for "culture with a Capital 'C'" had existed for decades, adding worthwhile courses in "Roman Law, Jurisprudence, and the then still unfamiliar fields of Constitutional Law," and "Administrative Law." 198 But, argued Llewellyn, law schools needed to do more, "to make the meaning of law to human people take on the same color that it has in a well-written drama, -a thing of excitement." development of a realistic sense on the basis of fact," in particular the interaction of legal doctrine with evolving customs. 200 Concerned with the cost of legal education and the practicality of legal training, Llewellyn remained mindful that inter-disciplinary methods could still be relevant to preparing students for other types of work, particularly policy work in the New Deal. As the private sector shrank, Columbia realized that one of the few areas of job growth in the country lay in government service, particularly as the Roosevelt Administration endorsed the creation of new federal agencies and, with them, new federal responsibilities. 201 As Columbia Law Professor Julius Goebel noted, the New Deal generated a "phenomenal increase in governmental functions," many of which required "competent lawyers." 202 Recognizing an emerging market for graduates, Columbia worked diligently to refashion itself as "training place for public service," in part by emphasizing "the importance of integrating work in public law into the professional law curriculum." 203 Fueling this move, confirmed Goebel, was the "decline of employment by law offices" caused by the rigors of the Great Depression." 204 While training students for government service had once been a prominent goal of Professor John Burgess, its primary advocate during the 1930s would be a much younger professor of Criminal Law, Herbert Wechsler. As the next section shall demonstrate, Wechsler joined an assault on the case method that would intersect in important ways with the decline of the LL.B. and the rise of the J.D..
V. THE CASE METHOD ON TRIAL
As the nation sank into Depression, members of Columbia's faculty began to call for new approaches to pedagogy, including a reconsideration of the role of public law in the law school curriculum. 205 One reason for such requests was a hope that students might gain jobs in federal offices involved in the New Deal, prompted by "the phenomenal increase in governmental functions during the early thirties" coupled with the "coincident decline of employment by law offices due to the rigors of the Great Depression." 206 Another was political. Perhaps no faculty member demonstrated this more clearly than Assistant Professor Herbert Wechsler. 207 Hired in 1933 to invigorate the teaching of public law at Columbia, Wechsler agreed to teach Criminal Law in the first year, replacing the more traditional private law course in Business Organization. 208 The new professor happened to believe that the Great Depression had been caused in part by a blind faith in the market, especially the dangerous endorsement of unregulated banking and an unpoliced stock exchange. 209 Such factors contributed to the economic crisis, believed Wechsler, and made a mockery of the formalist premise that economic affairs were best managed through the private adjudication of legal disputes.
210
The case method further confounded the problem, argued Wechsler, precisely because it perpetuated what Roscoe Pound called the common law's "antipathy to legislation," its tacit dismissal of state regulation as a lesser form of lawmaking than the private ordering of property and contract. doctrinal formalism. 213 Frankfurter's conviction that students should be taught that law is "an instrument" to be used for "human betterment" impressed them, as did Frankfurter's support for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. 214 Both Wechsler and Michael proudly endorsed Roosevelt, standing out as two of only five "New Dealers" on Columbia's law faculty at the time. 215 When the Supreme Court began striking down New Deal programs like the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the National Industrial Recovery Act on what they believed were overtly formalist, "closed system" grounds, both Wechsler and Michael placed at least some blame at the feet of the case method for producing a socially isolated, politically unresponsive judiciary. 216 As Wechsler later remembered it, the Court possessed no "receptivity to statutory changes of the common law," lacked any "sympathetic treatment of administrative agencies," and clung desperately to the notion of the common law as a "closed system," a position that deserved "unqualified disdain."
217
Rather than view law as a closed system, Wechsler came to view it in more "utilitarian" terms, an instrument of "statecraft" that could be used to pull the country out of its fiscal woes.
218
Before this could happen, however, lawyers and law students needed to learn to think about the law differently; as a tool for change and not a prophylactic to state intervention and control. Wechsler distilled these notions into four separate "articles of faith" that guided his legal career. 219 They included: 1) a rejection of the common law as a "closed system," 2) an emphasis on "judicial receptivity to statutory changes of the common law," 3) a presumption that "legal understanding is imperfectly obtained" and, 4) an "unqualified disdain" for the Supreme Court's formalist destruction of New Deal programs "despite the magnitude of the abuse and dislocation incident to the development of an industrial society." 220 Wechsler let his "articles of faith" guide his selection of materials for teaching criminal law. Not offered at Columbia prior to Wechsler's arrival on the faculty in 1931, criminal law had been virtually ignored due to the fact that it was "generally thought to have no money in it" and was 213 See supra note 209. 214 Frankfurter, supra note 49, at 539. 215 Wechsler, Interview, supra note 8. 216 Id. 217 Id. Not simply a financial crisis, the Depression also bore a radicalizing effect, pushing teachers and students to think more about "social problems" than they might otherwise have in more robust times. therefore "not interesting" to most "bread-and-butter" students.
221
Precisely for this reason, Wechsler saw teaching the course as an "opportunity" for him to put his philosophical and political assumptions into practice. 222 Yet, Wechsler did not stray completely from the case method. He and Michael chose an arguably conservative, perhaps even subversive path to reform by assembling "pedagogical materials" that included traditional cases but also "invited cogitation outside the closed system."
223 Rather than debunk the casebook entirely, they modified it to introduce students both to case reading and to "legislative or quasi-legislative judgment," in part by incorporating a variety of materials that pressed students to ponder "interesting questions" like: "what are the consequences of this or the other type of formulation or norm?" "How can we find out something about consequences?" And "how can we face up candidly to value choices?" 224 Such questions, believed Wechsler, constituted a "wholly different way of thinking about the law" than the earlier "Langdellian way."
225
Other members of the Columbia faculty also leaned towards incorporating new methodologies into their case method classes. In his landmark 1930 casebook on Sales, for example, Karl Llewellyn declared openly that "an effort" had been made "to draw on suggestions from the other social sciences," including "modern psychology," "sociology," and "anthropology." By the close of the 1930s, Columbia Law School had undergone a quiet transformation, directed by law professors committed to realigning legal pedagogy with New Deal politics, meanwhile preparing law students for new careers. During this time, Karl Llewellyn's enthusiasm for the "bramble bush" of the case method diminished, pushing him to become increasingly critical of legal education as the 1930s progressed. Others 221 Id. 222 Id. 223 Wechsler's decision to reform legal pedagogy by subtly undermining the case method might be criticized for not going far enough, for "allowing," as Bruce Ackerman puts it, "the profession to survive the New Deal without reconstructing its basic conceptual equipment." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 5 (1984 229 The first case, drawn from England, held that words alone could not constitute provocation but, if words led to combat "betwixt two upon a sudden heat," then any ensuing death could be charged as manslaughter. In the next case, a defendant was impressed into the "Majesty's service" without a valid warrant, leading several men to come to his rescue, killing a police officer in the process. Reluctant to offer "encouragement to private men to take upon themselves to be the assertors of other men's liberties," the court held that the killing was murder, not manslaughter. In the remaining six cases, all drawn from English courts, students were required to actively consider different applications of the principle of provocation, all arising from slightly different factual scenarios, including throwing a pickpocket into an "adjoining pond," stabbing a woman in the back after she delivered a "box on the ear," and killing a constable in response to an "illegal" arrest. classes were not."
233 While other courses stressed "legal distinctions and legal analysis" Wechsler mounted a class that was at once "highly analytical and self-consciously intellectual," pushing students to consider problems from a "legislative point of view." 234 Kadish left Wechsler's class transformed, eventually publishing his own, Wechsler-inspired casebook in 1960. 235 The book enjoyed lasting success, going through subsequent printings into the 21 st Century. 236 Meanwhile, Karl Llewellyn softened his attack on legal education, returning in the 1950s to calls for "legal scholarship" that "lay almost wholly outside the orbit of doctrine." 237 "
[O]nce war and the teaching jam were over," declared Llewellyn, "we had acquired a profession with heavy injections of new ideas, new personnel, new backgrounds of experience," and new "hungers for facts about the life of the law, for knowledge about and understanding of conditions in this sport or area or in that or somewhere else; even -and this is the most gratifying -hungers for knowledge and understanding of basic processes in legal institutions." 238 If the Depression sparked anger at legal education's failure to prepare practice-ready lawyers, in other words, the economic boom that followed World War II coincided with renewed interest in theoretical work. "I should guess," asserted Llewellyn in 1956, "that 1951-1960 offers prospect of three times as much significant research about matters legal, in areas other than doctrine, as got done in the whole preceding fifty years." 239 One year later, as Llewellyn settled into a new position at the University of Chicago Law School, he continued to exhibit enthusiasm for research, even criticizing law teachers who aimed to eliminate "that whole perspective and background of philosophy and of national and international governmental practice."
240 "[T[he arts of law," continued Llewellyn, "are not only essential to any professional work, they are also law's common ground with those humanities which are a university's core and pride, and among which law should stand with the proudest."
Llewellyn's reference to the humanities flagged a resurgent postDepression interest in keeping a place for law schools at the university's "core," a place otherwise dominated by departments focused heavily on academics and research. To demonstrate how Chicago Law School warranted a seat at the university's table, Llewellyn extolled it's diversity of course offerings, including "a most interesting comparative law development" involving "a full year's intensive work in a foreign legal system and its language … followed by a year's locally-supervised study and practice in the relevant foreign country," what Llewellyn described as an "ingenious device for equipping an American to do legal work across national and language barriers." 242 Llewellyn also celebrated Chicago's course offerings in jurisprudence, particularly its "Jurisprudence Law in Our Society," a course that involved "weekly papers" focused on "philosophies of government." 243 Yet, even as Llewellyn extolled scholarship, so too did he lament the textbook innovations of his former Columbia colleague Herbert Wechsler. 244 "[N]ot too many students are fully aware," argued Llewellyn, "of the ways in which today's case-books have tended to defeat the finest values open to the case-method," a not-so-subtle allusion to Wechsler's reduction in the number and length of cases that students were required to read. 245 Alarmed at the emerging popularity of Wechsler's approach, Llewellyn urged caution. Not only did new casebooks tend to over-edit cases, he argued, but their reduction in the total number of cases caused pedagogical problems as well. "[T]he case loses its very discussion value," argued the recently hired Chicago Professor, "if it is presented alone and simply to illustrate or communicate its rule, instead of appearing with companion cases to show development or to challenge to thoughtful distinction and synthesis and in either aspect to close the general situation in question with detail and flavor enough to turn student's policy-judgment into more than a guess or a daydream." 246 Luckily, Chicago "edited" cases "in the finest original tradition," much like he did in his book on Sales, providing a much needed counterpoint to the emerging trend. 247 Though careful not to implicate his new school, Llewellyn's critique of "today's case books" revealed the extent to which Langdell's method had begun to evolve as authors like Wechsler added new, secondary materials to provide inter-disciplinary perspectives. However, the emergence of such perspectives in the first three years of law school had an unanticipated effect. By introducing more theoretical materials to required courses, it diluted the notion that theoretical work should be reserved for optional, post-graduate degrees. Just as legal education became more inter-disciplinary, in other words, so too did legal reformers begin to call for awarding all graduates of three year law schools a doctorate; whether they completed independent research projects or not.
This became particularly obvious in the 1950s and 60s, as smaller, regional schools clamored for greater prestige. By 1964, for example, twenty seven schools had abandoned the Bachelor of Laws, or LL.B. for the J.D.; almost all regional institutions that enjoyed little national prominence. Time spent in school was a factor. "A change of the education symbol to J.D.," he argued, "is thus required to insure fairness to law school graduates who pursue three or more years of post-bachelor study." 252 By the time Hervey put pen to paper, a number of law schools had already moved to the Juris Doctor. While Hervey conceded that some required students to complete independent research projects before granting them a doctorate, most did not. "During the academic year 1963-64," he noted, the J.D. degree was conferred by 27 schools," only some of whom reserved it for "those who had attained a specific grade average or who had successfully completed a research project." 253 Rather than promote heightened research requirements, essentially nudging the J.D. in the direction of the Ph.D., Hervey called for cosmetic reform, arguing that a simple name-change would enhance the stature of law schools within larger university systems. "The receipt of a second bachelor's degree by law school graduates," he maintained, "tends to impair the image of the legal profession," meanwhile lowering "the image of the law school in the minds of those who instruct in the other divisions of the parent institution." 254 Not everyone agreed. According to George P. Smith, an instructor at the University of Michigan, law schools should strive to improve their core curricula if they wanted to command the respect of the larger academic community, not simply rename their degrees. "Although the 'image' of the general profession as well as the law schools need to be strengthened," conceded Smith, "the uniform awarding of the J.D. degree is not, at this particular time, the proper remedy to pursue. Rather, the development and improvement of the standards for the work done for the basic law degree should be of first and primary consideration." 255 Smith did not elaborate on how, precisely, the mandatory curriculum should be improved. However, he did seem to indicate that advanced level research remained better suited for advanced law degrees, either the Master of Laws (LL.M.) or the Doctor of Jurisprudence (S.J.D.). 256 Schools that awarded the S.J.D. and LL.M. tended not to support the J.D. movement for at least two reasons. One, the conferral of a doctorate on all students who had completed three years of law school undermined the prestige of advanced degrees. After all, why pursue an additional doctorate, much less a master's, if one already held a doctorate in hand? Two, the move to a uniform J.D. originated with inferior, evening law schools that did not support advanced research to begin with, VI. CONCLUSION: A DOCTORATE FOR ALL By the close of the 1960s, the Juris Doctor reigned ascendant over other law degrees, Columbia and Harvard both adopting it in 1969 and Yale -the final holdout -in 1971. 265 Thus ended a half-century of debate over the appropriate law school credential, even as the role of theoretical work, inter-disciplinary material and pure research in the first three years remained unsettled. As we have seen, early Progressive-era proponents of raising the academic profile of legal education lobbied for optional fourth and fifth years dedicated to academics and research resulting in a Masters and then Doctoral degree. 266 Such a system provided a clear, logical delineation between minimum standards required for entrance to the bar and more advanced work for those interested in specialization or pure academics. 267 The tier structure made further sense given that law students graduated with a second Bachelor's, or LL.B. upon completing the first three years, a holdout from the days when students could matriculate without first earning a Bachelor's of Arts or Science. 268 Karl Llewellyn's iconic Bramble Bush lectures extolled the practical value of the LL.B. system as late as 1929, even as schools across the country tacked an extra year onto their Bachelor's curriculum. 269 Though many students lamented the addition of a third year, Llewellyn embraced it, celebrating deeper immersion into legal topics, more interdisciplinary offerings, and a heightened profile for legal education generally. 270 Enter the Great Depression. 271 As this Article has sought to demonstrate, the economic downturn of the 1930s dramatically influenced views of legal education, a point illustrated starkly by Karl Llewellyn himself. 272 While enthusiastic about legal education in 1929, Llewellyn soured as the Depression dragged on. By 1935, he complained that law schools were mere "assembly lines" dedicated to taking their students "coin" and providing them little of practical value in return. 273 Llewellyn furthered this critique in 1936, joining a score of academics calling for pedagogic reform. 274 However, Llewellyn did not target inter-disciplinary scholarship. While some reformers called for an increased attention to clinical work and practical skills, Llewellyn joined a cadre of pro-New Deal law teachers who advocated inter-disciplinary, policy-centered coursework. 275 For example, Llewellyn's colleague Herbert Wechsler argued that private sector slowdowns could be compensated by placing students in federal New Deal agencies, a move that required at least some familiarity with inter-disciplinary, policy issues. 276 Further, Wechsler joined other scholars in de-emphasizing the value of the case method, arguing that it contributed to over-confidence in the private sector and did not warrant its dominant position in legal pedagogy. 277 To weaken the method's hold, Wechsler joined his senior colleague Jerome Michael in pioneering a new style of casebook featuring fewer opinions and more secondary, interdisciplinary materials. 278 As the Depression gave way to post-War prosperity, Wechsler's method caught on. 279 Even diehard proponents of the case method like Karl Llewellyn -who lamented the drop in assigned cases in books like Wechsler's -extolled the availability of inter-disciplinary offerings in fields such as comparative law and Jurisprudence. 280 That such offerings came in the first three years did not seem to bother anyone, even though they had once been reserved for optional, fourth and fifth year work.
281
That inter-disciplinary work had once been tied to fourth and fifth year classes remains one of the most overlooked aspects of law school history today. Current critics of legal education lament the fact that overly academic courses clutter the J.D. curriculum, forgetting that the simple pursuit of practical training underwent its own dark period prior to the Depression, as law schools strove to increase their standing among other university departments.
282
Early reformers solved this challenge by trifurcating law degrees, leaving the LL.B. for practice-minded students and the more advanced Master's and Doctorate degrees for students who wanted specialized, even abstract knowledge. 283 However, less prestigious schools clamored for the right to confer a higher credential in the 1950s and 60s, disrupting the Progressive-era equilibrium. 284 Just as the distinction between mandatory and optional work faded; so too did the J.D. movement confuse the role of pure research in legal pedagogy. 285 Yet, proponents of the J.D. movement justified their position, in part, by citing the increasingly theoretical nature of the three year curriculum. 286 Herein lies an irony that current law school critics fail to appreciate. Even as top law schools attacked the J.D. movement for watering down legal credentials, few proponents of that movement complained about theoretical work in the first three years, conceding that precisely such work warranted a Juris Doctor degree.
287
While we may wonder whether the incorporation of theoretical work into a three year curriculum is practically necessary, the rise of the Juris Doctor would arguably never have occurred had law schools simply aimed to train practitioners. As we have seen, its history is closely tied to efforts by legal reformers to make law school the equivalent of comparable graduate programs, a struggle arguably dating back to the days of Langdell. 288 Even John Hervey, champion of the "professional" doctorate, extolled the academic nature of the three year program, a program that did indeed become much more theoretical during the New Deal.
289
This leads to a final point. While current arguments that law school is too long may warrant merit, the conferral of a Juris Doctor for two years of practical/clinical training may not. Already, the legal doctorate lacks academic credibility compared to the Ph.D., further diluting its significance may only jeopardize the standing of law schools vis a vis other university departments, perhaps even leading universities to drop such schools during times of economic hardship for the putative reason that they lack intellectual value and/or rigor. As a parting thought, it may be better to keep law schools firmly wedded to the research mission of universities generally, meanwhile revisiting the question of plural degrees, perhaps a Master's of Law after two years work (with an option to then take the Bar exam), a Juris Doctor for three, and an S.J.D for more. As we have seen, there is not only precedent for such a move, but it enjoys a certain logic, perhaps one more compelling than the post-War argument that all lawyers deserve a J.D. simply because it sounds prestigious. REV. 1984 REV. (2012 . Shaving one year off the current curriculum will leave little room for inter-disciplinary, policy-oriented courses, and may even change the way doctrinal courses are taught. For example, two years reduces the time available to take bar classes, a move that they may push casebook authors and teachers to truncate their syllabi, and adopt more condensed teaching methods. Precisely such methods dominated American law schools during the early Progressive Era, as law schools crammed multiple topics into a single year through BarBri style lecture. While a return to lecture may be agreeable to some, important questions remain as to whether graduates of such truncated programs should receive a Juris Doctor degree. For free-standing law schools with no university ties, the answer may be yes. For law schools affiliated with larger, research universities, however, the abbreviation of legal education may warrant some consideration of the continued legitimacy of legal education in the eyes of universities generally, a dilemma that might warrant reconsideration of the plural degree.
